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Massively disruptive climate change, now inevitable, is the worst tragedy which human 
beings have yet brought on themselves. It is tragic in the full classical sense – a disaster 
entailed on the protagonist (here, humanity) by destructive weaknesses inherent in crucial 
strengths and virtues. There is thus no way of avoiding it by picking and choosing among our 
values, and its effects can neither be compensated for nor mitigated by prospective gains to 
offset against anticipated losses. But once we have discarded a strained and wilful last-ditch 
optimism, and recognised that we are not in control, we will still need to find genuine hope if 
we are to have any chance of coming through. This requires us to embrace the transformative 
power of tragic experience, letting go of values which we may hitherto have regarded as 
sacrosanct and welcoming the creative destruction of current assumptions and expectations as 
an affirmation of life. 
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“Therefore the sage manages affairs without action 
  ….. 
Ten thousand things arise and he does not initiate them, 
They come to be and he claims no possession of them, 
He works without holding on…..” 





How do we approach the worst tragedy which human beings have ever brought on 
themselves, in the recognition that its coming to pass is now inevitable? How might we 
advance with eyes open into this ending of the world as we have known it, without taking it 
for the end of the world – letting go of what we must, without losing the hope which is 
essential to living? How can we give up pretending without giving up altogether? 
 
The tragedy, of course, is anthropogenic climate change
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. I assume here an audience which  
accepts without reservation, what the overwhelming majority of relevant scientific expertise 
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has for a good while fully endorsed (see e.g. Oreskes, 2004), that the global climate is being 
irreversibly altered and that human activity is responsible. But the further claims, that this 
entails a short-to-medium-term future both uniquely grievous and now inescapable, may well 
need defending even to people who accept the reality of the underlying process. 
 
Inescapability is the simpler claim to demonstrate. The best way to enforce it is by appealing 
to what I have elsewhere called the Vicious Syllogism: if we had been going to avert the 
massively disruptive climate change and associated ecological degradation which will shortly 
start turning present global civilisation upside down, we’d have begun to put effective 
policies in place forty years ago when these concerns were first seriously mooted; we didn’t; 
so we won’t avoid it. This argument is valid and its premises are plainly true; in particular, 
the hypothetical major premise asserting that we are out of time is as well-grounded in the 
scientific evidence and in economic, sociological and geopolitical realism as any empirically-
based counterfactual could hope to be. The prospect of our acting collectively to turn the 
lumbering super-tanker of the carbon-dependent global economy around on a sixpence in the 
few years we have left before levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide take us past the tipping 
point (if they haven’t already) is simply incredible, on all those counts, to anyone seriously 
considering it. The conclusion of the syllogism follows by simple logic (the science of not 
being able to have things both ways at once) – which is not to say that refusal to accept it, 
indeed vehement denial of it, doesn’t still prevail at all levels.  
 
The deep roots of that denial are a separate issue – one which I tried to address in my recent 
book After Sustainability (Foster, 2015), which starts from the above argument. These roots 
go down far beneath ordinary and understandable reluctance to face up to a frightening 
prospect. But such reluctance clearly plays a part, and  is by itself well justified. Underlying it 
is the tacit recognition that what now confronts us is not a problem, nor even the hyper-
intensification of a clutch of problems   – a so-called ‘wicked problem’ (see Hulme 2009, 
334-40) – but a genuine tragedy. And while problems, even very challenging ones, can 
sometimes have solutions, genuine tragedy involves terrible loss, disastrous and 
uncompensated, for which nothing answering to the idea of a solution makes sense. This, for 
a modern mind accustomed to take material and social ‘progress’ as its unquestioned criterion 
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for human affairs and the problem-solution mode as its default practical expectation, is 
simply not to be contemplated. 
 
Nevertheless, and reluctance to recognise the facts notwithstanding: even if the worst-case 
scenario of runaway warming up to 6
o
C and beyond (Lynas 2007) is somehow avoided, the 
increasing climate instability to which we have already committed ourselves means that we 
face by around 2030, what a former UK government Chief Scientific Adviser (Beddington 
2009) has described as a ‘perfect storm’ of food, water and energy shortages, entailing world-
wide famine, disease and homelessness on an epic scale. This situation will certainly trigger 
enormous migrations and attempts at migration, and those currently temperate parts of the 
world where the immediate climatic effects of warming are likely to be comparatively less 
drastic will come under enormous pressure to admit refugees in numbers which would 
quickly overwhelm their resources and infrastructure, unless they take (as they mostly will) 
the hard decision to close their borders.  This in turn will produce both inter-communal and 
international conflict, much of it inevitably armed. Gwynne Dyer’s book Climate Wars (Dyer 
2008) presents realistic possibilities here, under any of which it is clear that the world is set to 
become both a much less habitable and a much more divided, hostile and violent place.   
 
II. 
The genuinely tragic nature of this prospect shouldn’t be much harder to appreciate. Tragedy 
is not just, in the crude journalistic solecism, any sufficiently drastic event involving death 
and mayhem. In the proper sense of the word, it arises when disaster ensues from and 
expresses destructive weaknesses which are inherent in the key life-strengths of an agent – 
whether that agent be an individual, an institution or, as in the present case, a mode of 
civilisation. This pattern is very apparent in the case of climate change. Deep-seated features 
of the secular and instrumentally-rational Enlightenment spirit which has produced so much 
worthwhile life-improvement across the world have also generated a pervasive inability to 
rein in the relevant activities before they do irreversible damage. What slogan-makers like to 
call ‘the success of science’ is visibly collapsing under the strain of its own contradictions. 
The trajectory launched by Baconian ambitions for technological mastery of nature is 
reaching the end it was always likely to reach, since humans remain part of nature whether or 
not they allow themselves to forget the fact, and setting themselves over against it in a spirit 
of attempted mastery has inevitably turned them dangerously destructive, both of their habitat 
and of their inner attunement to it. The biosphere has only been able to absorb so much of the 
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consequences without damage, and the limits here have now been reached – indeed, if we are 
persuaded by the Vicious Syllogism, they have been decisively transgressed. Distinctive 
human strengths which Western civilisation in particular has realised – the strengths to 
develop a sophisticated self-conception, to make rational deliberated choices, to base belief 
on evidence and empirical testing, to free ourselves from ignorance, superstition and dogma – 
are thus existentially rooted in aspirations to mastery and control which are responsible for 
this decisive eco-systemic damage. The epochal material successes hitherto consequent on 
our strengths have worked to blind us to what we are doing in exercising them, and indeed to 
neutralise most strivings towards self-recognition. All the classic ingredients of tragedy are 
here. 
 
Correspondingly, if we are to identify those whose fault this oncoming disaster is, they can 
only be ourselves, the world-wide human community, or at any rate its leading protagonists, 
the peoples of the West and North whom the rest strive increasingly to emulate. Attempting 
to blame everything on the institutional power and self-interest of corporations, for instance, 
while an understandable reaction in the face of much contemporary corporate behaviour, is 
essentially an exercise in scapegoating. Corporations exercise vast irresponsible power, create 
damaging pseudo-needs (especially in children) through advertising, and cause widespread 
ecological havoc in pursuit of their shareholders’ short-term financial interests. But they 
could not do these things, indeed they would not exist in their current forms, had not aspiring 
billions across the globe (taking their cue from, but no longer confined to, the West) 
remained eager to buy their products and benefit materially from their innovations.  
 
It is the equally classic purity of this pattern, as well as the extent and nature of the damage, 
which justifies the claim that climate change will constitute the worst tragedy which 
humankind has ever inflicted on itself. There have been many grievous episodes in history, 
some latterly producing chaos and suffering world-wide, though none, not even World War, 
has hitherto been systemically destructive enough to jeopardise the stability and integrity of 
large tracts of the biosphere on which human and all other life depends. But in every such 
episode to date, a driving role has been played by the traditional human vices of pride, greed 
and hatred, as appealed to by evil men (and women) in positions of power. This new disaster, 
however, we have brought upon ourselves by the headlong indulgence of what are in 
themselves perfectly creditable passions and desires – for equality, for recognition and 
respect, for general material betterment (that is, for the elimination of squalor, hunger and 
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disease, as well as for lives smoothed and facilitated by ‘consumer goods’). In the past these 
progressivist goals have elicited much that was best in our collective activity. We have 
latterly (since the Industrial Revolution) tried to pursue them by trading on our unprecedented 
new powers to tap a massive store of fossilised energy in their service, and it is our having 
done this in careless ignorance – and more recently, in denial-driven disregard – of the 
associated ecological and climatic consequences, which has betrayed us. 
 
At this point some will ask: given that analysis, where is the tragic inevitability? Can we not 
retain the motives and aspirations, while redeploying our powers in ways which henceforth 
do respect the biospheric constraints under which we must work? – so that even if it is too 
late for avoidance, we may still hope to mitigate the damage done by neglect to date, and at 
least to minimise adverse impacts on future people. 
 
This is of course the ‘sustainability’ model – and here it is necessary to recognise oncoming 
environmental and climate tragedy as in large measure a tragedy of sustainability, into which 
the related tragedies of progress, growth and (insofar as it differs) sustainable development 
are all now folded. This concept was meant to offer a paradigm for the way in which 
Enlightenment values could save us from their own consequences. It represented a 
progressivist solution to the problems of progressivism. Extending a universalist concern for 
human welfare rationally into the future, we were supposed to use our scientific knowledge to 
set ‘planetary boundaries’ (Rockstrom et al. 2009) guiding and limiting our pursuit of 
universal human welfare in the present. The twofold problem with this is (one might have 
thought) sufficiently glaring. In the first place, massively complex feedbacks and systemic 
sensitivities render human impacts on the biosphere into the medium-term future effectively 
indeterminable, so that the ‘constraints’ under which we are to operate have to be set by 
socially- and politically-driven choices rather than by the allegedly impersonal voice of 
science. And secondly, those choices can only be made by us, that is by present people 
(worldwide) whose pursuit of their own material welfare is thus supposedly to be 
constrained.
3
 This puts inter-generational humanity in essentially the situation of the well-
intentioned alcoholic tasked with setting his own safe drinking levels (and really trying) – 
something which might seem to make for comedy, were the case not so evidently tragic. The 
sincerely universalist and scientifically-rational pursuit of real and urgent human good for the 
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future undermines itself and defeats its own ends through just this pursuit of the same 
benefits for people presently alive. 
 
It is crucial to underline again the genuinely tragic structure of what we face. Neither 
embedded gross vices nor malevolent intentions but its own collective well-meaning (while at 
the same time self-serving) activity, is now bringing humankind to grief. This tragic structure 
is typically obscured, for instance, in the recently-burgeoning psychology literature which 
offers to analyse ‘values’ in relation to human environmental behaviour. This  literature tends 
to classify groups of values in broadly opposed types, the favoured arrangement involving a 
four-quadrant diagram – Schwartz, for instance, a seminal voice here, sets self-transcendence 
against self-enhancement values, and those representing openness to change against those 
representing conservatism. By values he means, plausibly enough, broad conceptions of what 
is important in life, which serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social 
entity (Schwartz 1994). Universalism and benevolence are what he calls self-transcendence 
values, while achievement, power and hedonism are self-enhancement values. Characteristic 
sub-values falling under these various heads are then identified as: 
Universalism: equality, social justice, ‘world at peace’ 
Benevolence: helpfulness, responsibility, forgiveness 
Achievement: success, ambition, capability 
Power: authority, wealth, recognition 
Hedonism: pleasure, enjoyment of life 
Schwartz claims that such sub-values are activated in packages, so that if one’s behaviour is 
driven principally by self-transcendence values one will be correspondingly less moved by 
those in the opposite quadrant (self-enhancement) and vice-versa. Thus someone concerned 
for equality and social justice is likely also to be concerned for helpfulness and responsibility 
towards others, and less likely to be motivated by wealth, recognition or the delights of 
consumerism.  
 
There is certainly some cross-cultural empirical evidence for this clustering of values, and 
specifically in relation to environmental issues, with universalism values such as empathy for 
distant others and global equity being associated with ecologically-responsible and pro-
environmental behaviour, whereas self-enhancement values like consumerism and 
competitiveness are associated with a lack of concern for the natural world, a disposition to 
doubt the reality of global warming and so on (see e.g. Schultz et al. 2005; also Andrews 
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2017 in this Special Issue). And if this rather Manichean picture of bi-polarity were the whole 
story, it would be easy enough to blame our present environmental plight on the dominance 
of self-enhancement values (those of consumerist materialism, fostered and embedded no 
doubt by neo-liberal capitalism) over those self-transcendence values which might have led 
us to recognise and respect biospheric limits. 
 
But whatever the evidence from statistical surveys, which familiarly have their own problems 
of methodology and interpretation, bi-polarity is a potentially misleading guide where 
progressivism is concerned. If one considers the value-nexus involved, the above 
categorisations decisively break down. Values driving progressivism come from every 
segment of Schwartz’s classification. It is about universalising, on terms of equality and 
social justice, the social power, family security, health, capability, autonomy and freedom of 
human beings, presupposing peace and (at least implicitly) environmental protection (the 
sustainability agenda has been about making this last requirement explicit). We have been 
able to put together an anthropocentrically-conceived combination of values from all these 
quarters, thanks to the availability of technologies for releasing and utilising fossil energy. 
This has certainly skewed our thinking away from wisdom and unity with nature, 
undermining effective environmental protection and diminishing our sense of responsibility 
so that it applies only to human betterment. The tragedy of progressivist value might then be 
identified as a tragedy of anthropocentric benevolence, given by technocratic means a false 
sense of impunity in respect of environmental constraints. But it is a tragedy in the full sense, 
rather than simply a black-and-white victory (temporary or permanent) of the 
environmentally damaging over the environmentally benign side of our nature, precisely 
because the damage which we are bringing on ourselves comes out of our full evaluative 
complexity as human beings. Tragedy is never black-and-white – values expressing all 
aspects of our nature are always involved, just as they have been here. 
 
The unfolding of this disaster has thus displayed a Sophoclean remorselessness. What deters 
people from looking it in the face is as much what it implies for our self-understanding and 
our value-commitments as for our material future. The values which it begins to look as if we 
shall have to give up, because not only have they been driving the damage but no imaginable 
state of human survival looks compatible with continuing to live by them, are the central 
Enlightenment values by which decent people have long defined themselves: the assertion of 
universal human rights to life, to equality of respect and political liberty and to the open-
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ended pursuit of material betterment. We can already, in fact, see breakdown of this value-
consensus happening on a smaller scale in relation to the current Mediterranean refugee 
crisis. Escapees from intolerable conditions evidently have a basic right to pursue the good 
life elsewhere, and those in (still) comparatively comfortable Europe therefore an obligation 
to accommodate and help them. But equally, Europeans have a basic right to their established 
folk-ways, the inherited and deeply internalised structures of feeling and community which 
form an essential part of their own flourishing, and on which large influxes of culturally-
different strangers are bound to inflict disruptive change. Oncoming climate chaos will write 
this kind of disabling conflict within our ruling value-schema very much larger, for all those 
currently temperate regions of the planet which will remain broadly habitable as global 
temperatures increase. It is because it threatens to prevent us from continuing to build our 
collective activity on the full range of these compelling evaluative attachments to which we 
have become so accustomed, but rather will set some of them more or less violently against 
others, that nothing as radically tragic as this has, indeed, ever happened to us before. 
 
III. 
To repeat, then: how do we approach a tragedy of this order and these dimensions?  
 
I mean this in the first place not as the question: what plans and dispositions do we make in 
order to bring whatever we can of human civilisation through it (though very clearly that 
question must also be asked) – but rather: how do we think about it, in the present, as a now-
inevitable prospect?
4
 This matters because our thinking must grapple with how we might now 
make room for hope, the absolutely necessary basis for any practical planning and preparing 
at all, without misconceiving such hope in a kind of last-ditch effort of denial and avoidance. 
 
One thing which would clearly qualify as avoidance is the belief that if we can only bring 
ourselves to recognise that this is going to happen, that might spur us finally to exertions 
sufficient to prevent its happening…That is just magic thinking. Less obviously muddled, but 
closely allied, is the belief that even if significant adverse climate change is now inevitable, 
we can at well past the eleventh hour divert its worst effects by scientific wizardry, so that 
somehow it won’t be so bad. That would just be to pursue a ‘solution’ in the technocratic top-
down mode of would-be planetary mangaement which has itself brought us to this pass. Both 
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those reactions, in fact, would now only be exercises in willed optimism, not so much a basis 
for necessary forethought as a deliberate refusal to see our real situation for what it is. By 
contrast, the hope in pursuit of which we must now task our thinking can only be what we 
might call tough hope: something so difficult to achieve precisely because of its utter 
inconsistency with letting us off the hook which we have so vigorously prepared for 
ourselves. 
 
That was the kind of hope to which I meant to refer in the subtitle of my book mentioned 
above. I wrote about it there in terms of the opportunity potentially afforded by prospective 
breakdown to repossess ways of understanding ourselves which current life-modes occlude 
from us, as means to developing the best forms of practical resilience that we can. But the 
approach required for its exposition at least a sketch of plausibly retrievable practical 
resilience on the ground, and the danger (perhaps not avoided in that book) is that aspiring to 
plausibility in any such sketch risks turning retrieval, however detached from the illusions of 
progress, into an offer to palliate the tragic, to offer some kind of compensation for it. 
Progress may be over, the thought then runs, but we can at least move to more satisfactorily 
human-scale communities, enabling fuller and more naturally-responsible individual lives, in 
the process of building the resilience needed to cope with what is coming. At the very least, 
we shall develop stronger muscles and a more active community spirit when the smooth 
facility of mechanical civilisation starts to fail… 
 
But this, I have since come to recognise, won’t do either. It is an attempt to offset losses 
against gains, and profit-and-loss accounting of any kind is a conceptually as well as an 
emotionally inadequate response to tragedy. If we come to rest there, we have surely avoided 
or betrayed the tragic experience, shirking the reality of radical loss and damage which now 
actually confronts us. And such shirking, equally surely, offers no real hope for coming 
through. 
 
We have rather to ask the much harder question: how can we see the tragedy itself, neither 
minimised nor shirked, and irrespective of whatever may ensue, as hopeful? 
 
Here, we move onto terrain classically marked out by Friedrich Nietzsche. In The Birth of 
Tragedy he writes of “the metaphysical solace which… we derive from every true tragedy, 
the solace that in the ground of all things, and despite all changing appearances, life is 
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indestructibly mighty and pleasurable…”(Nietzsche 1872: 39). And it is clear from the wider 
context that solace isn’t meant to be even consolation, still less compensation: it is meant for 
a kind of exultation, both intellectual (‘metaphysical’) and more than intellectual, something 
which Yeats later called “tragic joy”5, that is implicit in our acknowledgement of the very 
forces which make the pain and destruction what they are. 
 
But we cannot just take over Nietzsche’s ideas unmodified in the present case. While we 
should, I believe, try to retain his perspective, which has the huge merit of taking tragedy 
with proper philosophical seriousness, there are two major difficulties with applying it to the 
tragedy of anthropogenic climate change. 
 
The first is that Nietzsche is writing about (classical Greek) tragedy as drama, an art-form in 
relation to which our position is that of spectators, not protagonists. It requires a considerable 
effort of realignment to transfer this framework of understanding to tragedy which is going to 
happen to us, for real and not as symbolic representation. With tragedy on the stage, we 
contemplate a painful action involving the destruction of much that is admirable and good, 
and culminating very typically in the powerfully symbolic death of the person or persons at 
the centre of this action. From this we go away chastened but nevertheless with a sense of 
spirit somehow clarified, and a kind of enhanced vitality. But to experience this, we have to 
be able to walk away, back into our own continuing lives. In the tragedy now confronting us 
we do not have that option, and the climactic death looks destined for us, if not in every case 
as individuals, then as a civilisation and a way of life. The only way to take anything positive 
from that will be to take it through to the other side of it, and that requires us to imagine a 
further side that is plausibly habitable. We are thus apparently caught in a paradox of 
anticipation: if climate disaster is going to be terminal, its tragedy cannot yield us anything 
positive to take beyond it, since there will be no beyond – but to the extent that we don’t see 
it as somehow terminal, its tragic significance will tend to be defused. 
 
It is no surprise, accordingly, that in their interesting recent book Climate Change as Social 
Drama, sociologists Philip Smith and Nicolas Howe reject the classical Greek form of 
tragedy as an interpretive model for social action because, they claim, it “keys to fatalism”. 
Since in these ancient dramas whatever the protagonist attempts is liable to be undone by the 
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intervening gods or the power of destiny, seeing our current situation in that light “does not 
encourage sacrifice for a cause and collective action but rather the kind of apathy that in the 
context of climate change leads to conventional carbon-hungry lifestyles” (2015:38). This is a 
rather overdrawn picture of human abjectness even for Aeschylean tragedy, since after all the 
gods can only work on men and women through their natural aspirations and motivations. It 
does, however, flag up a constant worry for anyone advancing the kind of argument which I 
am making here. If one cannot find a convincing account of giving up pretending without 
giving up altogether, then exhorting people to recognise climate chaos as now tragically 
inevitable does indeed run a real risk of encouraging them to disengage from any kind of 
remedial action and cultivate their own technology-intensive gardens while there is still time. 
 
Smith and Howe’s enterprise is to deploy literary categories going back to Aristotle’s Poetics 
– from heroic quest, through narrative to low comedy – for help in interpreting patterns of 
perception and action, or inaction, on climate change. Seeking to circumvent the dangers of 
fatalism and apathy, they prefer to invoke tragedy on the Renaissance model of the tragedy of 
character. The prospect of climate chaos is then to be approached as “a hypothetical future 
outcome that can only arise if bad choices are made by complex sovereign decision-making 
agents…ranging from world leaders to ordinary citizens” (op.cit.:40). This, however, takes us 
straight back to climate change as no more than a very challenging or ‘wicked’ problem, to 
be solved by ensuring (surprise!) that we make good choices rather than bad. In effect it 
reduces to the shroud-waving use of ‘tragic’ which talks up the inevitability of climate 
disaster in order to spur us into avoiding it. As we have already seen, that line of thought is an 
evasion. But then, recognising it as such, we are still left with the need to find positives to 
take from a tragedy in which we ourselves are protagonists some of whom might conceivably 
come through. 
 
The second major difficulty with invoking Nietzsche for help in confronting this prospect is 
represented by the kind of positive which he himself offers. His appeal is always to the 
‘Dionysian’ life-energy which tragedy releases from the grip of Apollonian intellect (which 
must grasp the workings-out of Fate or circumstance in terms of their impacting on 
representative human character). We watch the tragic hero being inevitably defeated by the 
personified and stylised forces of nature, and in the very same process are forcefully 
reminded that, as Schopenhauer had put it, we ourselves are nature (1819: 281-2). But such 
an invocation of the indestructible might of life takes on a peculiarly ironic note in a context 
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where what is distinctive about the tragedy now in train is that it involves, precisely, the 
large-scale destruction of life, and not just of the non-human life beyond the human but of the 
underlying biospheric substrate which all life shares. Our being opened through tragedy to an 
influx of natural energy from this fundamental life-source was what for Nietzsche could put 
us back in touch with a power “ineradicably behind and beyond civilisation” (1819: ibid.), 
but the essence of our present tragedy is that, given the utterly unprecedented extent and 
colonising force of humanised life-space right across the biosphere, there is now in effect 
nothing “beyond civilisation”. There remain, of course, even in the long-urbanised and over-
populated British Isles, areas of wilderness and quasi-wilderness; but they subsist, while they 
still do, by permission or protection, and nothing genuinely wild does that. The result is that 
when, like safari tourists in a game reserve, we turn to the ‘wild’ for escape and renewal, we 
find only what lives within boundaries (however locally distant) which humans have set. 
 
As I have suggested, we should hold onto a Nietzschean approach if we can – that is, the 
boldness to look into tragedy, rather than in various ways away from it or past it, for the 
possibility of hope. But what that means is that the “metaphysical solace” of which he speaks 
must now be sought in the conditions of human action itself, rather than in any redemptive 
access of life-energy from the non-human. In our world now, only the necessary 
preconditions of human action lie “beyond the reach of civilisation”. The only non-human 
domain that we haven’t by now decisively humanised, because we can’t ever ‘humanise’ it, 
lies in the conceptual grounds of all human activity. The only way we can reconnect with the 
wild, with life-energy form beyond humanity which might renew both hope and joy, is to 
embark as courageously as we can in a radical shake-up of what we can’t choose, because it 
forms the conceptual framework for all our choices.  
 
It will probably take the rest of the paper to make this claim intelligible (and the paper itself 
is only an exploratory first attempt on its subject-matter), but some initial clarification is 
obviously in order. By the grounds or necessary preconditions of human activity, I mean what 
is conceptually basic to that activity as such – what has to be there for it to be ‘activity’. That 
means personhood – because without a person as the origin of action, there is no real activity, 
merely the causal involvement of a biological entity in species-appropriate initiations and 
reactions. Linked to personhood must be value, the fundamental form of motivation 
appertaining to persons as such (as opposed to instinct, appetite and aversion, all of which we 
share with other forms of animal life). Correspondingly, the third conceptually necessary 
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element is deliberate goal-directed engagement, because our values call for realisation 
through our intentionally making some things happen in the real world rather than other 
things.  
 
Now these fundamentals are, it would seem, conceptually inseparable – but within that nexus 
of implication perhaps they are capable of bearing more than one relation to one another. 
Standardly, we think of the capacity to identify goals in the light of our values, and to assess 
the outcomes of our actions towards these goals according to how far they have succeeded in 
implementing those values, as a centrally defining feature of the kind of personhood – 
conscious, agential, reflectively rational – which we take ourselves to have. This is 
‘Enlightenment man’ in control of his own destiny – or at least, with the potential to be so, if 
he rises to Kant’s demand that he ‘dare to know’. But maybe neither value nor personhood 
need have these mutual bearings and implications, and maybe they can be differently 
understood in relation to our involvement in goal-directed action. In that case, maybe the life-
energy sprung by environmental and climate tragedy is to be found precisely in the liberation 
from one pattern of self-understanding here, into a vitally different one – a new sense of the 
human self in evaluative action with which climate tragedy challenges us. 
 
IV. 
Tragedy, at its most basic, puts our world of value in jeopardy. It represents an anticipated 
triumph of what we take to be thoroughly and grievously bad over what we hold to be good, 
and it does so through the subversion from within, as it were, of qualities like courage or 
kingly authority or (in the environmental case) universalist commitment to the general 
welfare, which had seemed to us good and desirable. It makes sense, therefore, to start trying 
to get a grip on the issues which climate tragedy raises for our deep conception of human 
agency, by thinking about those which it raises for our stance as valuers. 
 
Anticipating tragedy means seeing this prospective assault on our cherished values within the 
fully tragic framing outlined above – with disaster precipitated, that is, by destructive 
weaknesses recognised as inseparable from key strengths. This requires, in the first place, that 
what is coming cannot be understood simply as unmitigated disaster – sheer loss, mere 
catastrophe, felt only as pain and grief – because to experience it as such would be only to 
reaffirm, by the via negativa as it were, the values according to which it presents itself as 
disaster. Thus, to think that climate change will be irredeemably catastrophic because it will 
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mean the halting and reversal of ‘progress’, is to anticipate it exclusively through continued, 
regretful but unchallenged attachment to the range of Enlightenment values, already noted, 
which inform that ideal. There is a very clear sense in which such an essentially defensive 
reaction doesn’t do prospective tragedy anything like justice. Insofar as we are anticipating 
disaster as the upshot of weakness inherent in key strengths, that is, we must have at least 
begun to stand back from, to adopt a more ironic, detached and critical view of, the 
assumptions according to which what is coming would have to be seen as disaster 
unmitigated, the grievous defeat (by merely adverse circumstances) of a wholly 
commendable human enterprise. 
 
But, very importantly that doesn’t mean that we must instead think of climate chaos as 
potentially mitigated disaster – with prospective gains to be offset against the losses. That 
kind of accounting, as I noted above, is also radically un-tragic, and now we can see more 
clearly why: it is, again, a way of trying to preserve essentially untouched by prospective 
tragedy certain relevant values which we hold prior to undergoing it. We may indeed come to 
see technological-progressivism as self-defeating, and so get beyond mere regret for the 
values driving it, but there is a danger that, if we then expect to recover things like greater 
physical robustness, the spirit of community solidarity and so on (all, obviously, good things 
in themselves), we do no more than turn back to existing values hitherto overshadowed by 
those in the ‘progressive’ package (until that was recognised as having breakdown built into 
it). Thinking in such terms does indeed mean that we leave room for learning something from 
tragedy, as merely regretting it does not; but to have done only this would be to have 
remained at a level which again we must recognise to be inadequate to the experience. 
Tragedy taken seriously must be expected to do much more than shift the balance of 
emphasis among our existing values, or free us from commitments to which we were 
mistakenly attached so that others can come unchallenged to the fore. 
 
That is why, despite its force and clarity, Rupert Read’s paper elsewhere in this Special Issue 
(Read 2017) points us in a crucially wrong direction. Read wants to argue that an escalating 
series of climate disasters will yet carry with them as an unexpected boon an opportunity for 
the development of community. He hopes that the attendant breakdown of social relations 
founded on liberal-individualist values will be the necessarily traumatic spur to the 
emergence of alternatives founded in solidarity and co-operation. What this ignores is 
precisely that the climate disasters will cumulatively constitute climate tragedy – the 
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revealed-to-be-inevitable self-undermining of the avowedly good, the genuinely admirable 
and strong. And tragedy, unlike mere disaster, is only itself if it strikes at our value-
assumptions so deeply as to shake the whole structure.  
 
This point is absolutely central to my argument. Tragedy shakes all our values, and not 
merely those which recognisably bring disastrous outcomes upon us, because it shakes our 
reliance on value – that is, our trust that we can make generally good choices by investing in 
an evaluative world-view. It tests to destruction our security in being able to make 
dependable moral sense of the world. Tragedy, as an art-form, is such a vital part of the 
human heritage of self-knowledge precisely because moral sense-making tends so readily to 
become routinized, habitual (we “have our principles”, we “know what’s right”), and our 
moral reflexes to lose their living responsiveness. Tragedy shows us how values as explicit 
commitments in moral sense-making (rules, principles, codified virtues) so frequently aren’t 
strong, subtle or complex enough for the charges of life-energy, the stresses of deep need and 
self-realising impulse, which have to pass through them. Honourable ambition, proper 
authority, passionate love…all these can so easily lead us astray when we take them for 
granted as commitments – and if these can, what may not? Tragedy shows us how our values 
become a self-comforting carapace, something in which to hide ourselves from ourselves, 
unless they are constantly being revitalised by a process of creative destruction. By the same 
token, it reveals on each tragic occasion not just the inadequacy of certain values as against 
others (which might then form the basis of compensation or mitigation), but the existential 
precariousness of our whole practice of evaluative living. That is why it leaves no values 
standing unquestioned, even when the destruction wrought out through a given tragic 




Tragedy looming for ourselves, in other words – tragedy acknowledged as such and honestly 
anticipated – can be foreseen neither as mitigated nor unmitigated disaster, because we 
recognise that the experience of it is going to unsettle the very basis of that dichotomy. 
Oncoming climate and environmental disaster is only being taken seriously as tragedy when 
it is being foreseen as something which will transform our relevant values, across the board –  
both those according to which the loss entailed will be disastrous and those by which we 
                                                 
6
 At the close of all great tragic drama, nothing remotely to be described as an unqualified positive is ever 
asserted. (The reader is invited to test this claim against his or her own reading.) 
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might have been consoled or compensated for it – and will do so in ways which beforehand 
we simply can’t know or condition for.  
 
Anticipated real-life tragedy thus insists on itself as a peculiarly acute case of what has 
recently been described by the American philosopher Laurie Paul as ‘transformative 
experience’. The defining feature of such experience is that it provides you with knowledge 
which you cannot acquire except by personally undergoing the experience in question, and 
which, so acquired, could be sufficient to “change your personal phenomenology in deep and 
far-reaching ways…perhaps by replacing your core preferences with very different ones” 
(Paul 2013: 8).  Her original example, in the paper from which this comes, is the classically 
life-changing experience of giving birth to a child. The main interest of this for Paul herself, 
as a theorist of rational choice, is that if an experience is likely to have this effect, it cannot be 
evaluated beforehand for the purposes of weighing up whether or not to undergo it  (nor, 
presumably, afterwards for the purposes of retrospective justification) because it may be 
expected to change the structure of  values (prudential or moral) essential to one’s 
prospective or retrospective evaluation – either to delete some and substitute others, or to 
change how one’s different values are interpretively felt to stand to one another, so that in 
neither direction are we ever comparing by a common standard or from a single perspective. 
Characteristic further examples of such potentially transformative experience offered by Paul 
include gaining a new sensory ability (as with a cochlear implant for someone born deaf), 
undergoing major surgery, participating in a revolution and embracing a religious conversion.  
 
Of course none of these (still less child-bearing) need be contemplated as a prospective 
tragedy. But to anticipate some genuinely tragic event which one knows one has to go 
through represents an acute case of the epistemological and existential jeopardy in which all 
these experiences place us, because here we know, just in virtue of the tragic framing within 
which what is coming presents itself to us, that our values are about to be wrenched and 
subverted across the board. And thus the prospect of climate tragedy threatens us with a 
profound form of loss, quite over and above the material loss and damage which it will entail 
– a loss of control at the deep level where our sense of ourselves as persons is generated. 
        
We can bring out what is involved here by contrast with a definition of ideal-type control 
offered by Daniel Dennett in one of his perversely illuminating discussions of free will: “A 
controls B if and only if the relation between A and B is such that A can drive B into 
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whichever of B’s normal range of states A wants B to be in…for something to be a controller 
its states must include desires…about the states of something else” (Dennett 1984: 52 – 
emphases in original). What is not said here, but is necessarily implied, is that A’s desires 
must be independent of B’s changes in state. The notion that A is in control of B, in other 
words, is the complex notion both that B varies only (on the relevant occasion) in response to 
A’s desires, and also that A doesn’t co-vary as a desiring agent across such variations in B. I 
control something if it does my will, but this requirement has to hold my will constant across 
whatever the thing which I am controlling relevantly does.  
 
This being so, and facing inevitable tragedy for ourselves being to face radically 
transformative experience, it must therefore also be to face the prospect of an absolute or 
‘metaphysical’ loss of control. It is not just that a painful process will contingently escape our 
ability to govern it, but that it will be one which dissolves the possibility of control as a 
matter of the logic of both tragedy and control. It will be, precisely, a process across which 
the values and desires by which the will shapes itself must be expected not to hold constant. 
Rather, what we must look forward to is the transformation into something as yet unknown of 
motives to which, as we look forward, we are still very powerfully attached. Prospective loss 
of control is thus prospective loss of values which ground our present identity. This is in a 




But now, we have already seen reason to suppose that the implications of this recognition run 
far wider than tragedy, which only presents such loss of control at its most acute and 
threatening. For by just the same token, the various challenging but comparatively ordinary 
experiences which Paul discusses as potentially transformative must be seen as involving the 
same possible dissolution of control for the agent undergoing them. Just to the extent that I 
cannot make a rationally-weighed decision beforehand about whether to commit myself to 
such an experience, nor know in advance how I will evaluate it afterwards if I should do so, I 
have ceased to be in control of what is going to happen. And this prospect, once we are 
brought to acknowledge it, can be seen to confront us across a wide range of decisions 
generally unavoidable in any ordinary life – in relationships (do I follow through on this deep 
attraction?), in work (do I make this rather scary career move?) or in connection with one’s 
health (do I take this reputedly mind-altering medication?), to name but several. In action we 






As I indicated above, this paper is intended only as an exploratory foray. The topic deserves 
at least a book, which I at least hope to write. But for the purposes of provisional summary, I 
will now review briefly where I think the exploration has so far got us, and suggest some 
directions in which it might continue. 
 
The tragedy of anthropogenic climate change, honestly recognised as a radically 
transformative experience through which humanity has now shortly to pass, must surely 
compel us to admit, in the first place, the general truth which it so drastically exemplifies: 
that humans are not in control of the most serious, life-significant events in which they are 
implicated. Coming to accept that this is the case is one vitally important way in which we 
will have to accustom ourselves to letting go. 
 
Where might this recognition of non-control leave us as creatures who formulate and act 
upon values? The guiding thought here is that if we are to respond creatively to the way in 
which tragedy will put all our values to the question, we must learn to do something which 
might be described as letting go of our values, without giving up on them. That would mean, 
I suggest, learning to treat our evaluative commitments and principles as at best ongoing 
heuristics, subject to revision and reinterpretation in the light of experience, while at the same 
time accustoming ourselves to condition for and trust in the moral robustness of the 
unsearchable whole self which such principles always express (unsearchable, ungraspable in 
thought, because thinking about it necessarily objectifies what must be subjective to be what 
it is).  
 
This is too large an issue to do more than gesture towards here. A phrase like “letting go of 
our values” might be expected to set alarm bells ringing: the opposite of letting go is holding 
on, and isn’t holding on to one’s values (through difficulties, in face of temptation...) the 
prime characteristic of moral strength? But one can hold onto values, as onto beliefs and 
relationships, as one holds onto Nurse – “for fear of finding something worse”.  There is a 
deeper moral resilience in trusting to what one’s perhaps changing explicit values are 
expressing. One might live by a certain value, such as loyalty to a professed commitment or 
solemn promise, by striving always to control one’s actions so that they were directed to 
goals which reflected the value. But mightn’t one instead (and perhaps more realistically, 
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given the above considerations about ‘control’) simply embark oneself in action, to whatever 
provisional goal made best sense, entrusting oneself to the spirit of the value? The difference 
would be that between always deliberately setting out to do this kind of thing rather than that, 
and always trying to bring one’s predispositions creatively to bear on where one’s action (in 
its quality of always tending to slip away from one’s intentions) was actually taking one.  
 
Here we might note a worry about the whole idea of ‘transformative experience’: doesn’t it in 
important kinds of case offer us a cheater’s charter? After all, if my whole personal 
phenomenology and core preferences are liable to be altered by (say) plunging into this very 
tempting prospective affair, maybe my by-then-broken promise of faithfulness to my wife 
won’t (then) look like such a big deal. But the point is that if I go ahead while tacitly banking 
on that self-gratifying outcome, I am actually refusing the real transformativity of the 
experience, while to embrace it will also be to accept that I might emerge having for the first 
time fully realised how precious to me my now-irretrievable faithfulness really was. Genuine 
creativity, in moral life as in art – as, indeed, anywhere – involves running radical risk. I 
honour values which have mattered to me no more by clutching them tightly to me than by 
slyly abandoning them: rather, I do so by taking their promptings with me into unpredictable 
life-change, where that is a decision of the whole being, in full awareness that this could 
renew me – or break me. 
 
Letting go of one’s values in this sense is not abandoning them. Abandonment is still 
(paradoxically) about control – I try to control my experience self-protectively by resiling 
from demands on myself which I have given up aspiring to meet. But creative letting-go is 
more like a standing-aside of the would-be controlling ego so that the value can find its own 
living way. What one is letting go of is, at bottom, a certain relation of the self to value – that, 
in fact, which was noted at the end of Section III as defining our currently-favoured view of 
rational agency. It is exemplified both by anxious attachment to and by self-defensive 
abandonment of one’s values, since these are both relations of which ‘self’ and ‘value’ form 
distinct terms. In letting go, one is recovering the self as ongoingly constituted in the values 
which we find our actions expressing.  
 
To repeat, there is no creativity without risk. A serious risk here is the evidently large scope 
for bad faith which goes with such a conception of value in action. Letting go of principled 
control so that the whole, dark self which one’s values creatively express can realise itself 
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open-endedly sounds bold and brave, but it could also very easily become one’s preferred 
way of disguising from oneself special pleading, a habit of backsliding or even moral 
nihilism. Certainly, philosophical work needs to be done to explore the implications for moral 
integrity and active responsibility of this kind of evaluative letting-go. (For some initial 
orientation, one might look to the recent revival of interest in a broadly intuitionist moral 
particularism – see for instance Dancy 2004). 
 
Some of the issues here may be sharpened by an example, and for this it will be best to return 
to the climate situation, since broad policy considerations for that future represent another  
main head under which this work needs to be advanced. These considerations are going to be 
very difficult, since they involve anticipating now, and conditioning for, how we might (as 
valuers to be transformed by the experience of climate tragedy) hope to make case-by-case 
practical sense of the broken world with which that tragedy will leave us (or some of us) to 
deal. 
 
I take the idea of the ‘broken world’ from Tim Mulgan’s fascinating and inventive book 
Ethics for a Broken World : he defines it as “a place where resources are insufficient to meet 
everyone’s basic needs, where a chaotic climate makes life precarious and where each 
generation is worse off than the last” (2011: ix). Setting aside the intergenerational issues for 
the moment, consider that such a world will contain by definition what Mulgan calls ‘survival 
bottlenecks’ – situations in which there are more people making a claim on available 
resources than those resources will support in meeting their basic survival needs. Indeed, the 
whole world will be a gigantic bottleneck of this kind – with a still-growing global population 
increasingly straitened by reductions in the availability of habitable land, food production 
capacity, usable water and easily-deliverable energy, all complicated by the ramifying 
infrastructural derangement which increasing climate chaos will also entail. 
 
In any such situation, humanity will be faced with the novel but appalling demand for 
institutional and regulatory procedures to determine not just ‘who gets what’ (the classic 
distributional problem in politics) but who survives. How are resource allocation decisions to 
be made, given that a direct upshot of such decisions will be that some people (on a global 
scale, perhaps many millions of people) will die and others won’t? Unless they are going to 
be made simply by force majeure, with the accompanying breakdown of anything resembling 
civilisation, we must hope that these decisions will be made on some kind of principle which 
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will allow law and governance to continue operating, and the obvious candidate for such a 
principle is that of justice. But what would justice entail in such a case?  
 
Looking at this question from where we are now, it would seem to involve finding some way 
to take seriously the idea (which Mulgan canvasses) of a survival lottery. And surely ideal-
type justice for a survival bottleneck would mean (after perhaps excluding certain categories 
such as the very aged or the terminally ill who aren’t going to make it anyway) something 
broadly equivalent to issuing everyone a lottery ticket, with only as many winning tickets as 
there are going to be packages of ‘basic survival’ resources available. Thereby everyone 
would have an equal chance, and the fairness of the procedure might go some way to 
encouraging acceptance (if only among those charged, dismally, with enforcement), since 
pure luck would determine who wins through – rather than the historical-geographical and 
climatic good luck (improved through centuries of exploitation and canny management) by 
which people from certain areas within the broken world will remain comparatively well-
provided with resources while others have been impoverished or indeed rendered destitute. 
 
So much for the ideal. In actuality, of course, people finding themselves in anything 
approaching such straits will strive to protect their own families and communities, by 
institutional and legal means as far as possible and then in the last resort by force. And one 
possible, even tempting, response to this recognition is a kind of brutal realism: ‘If justice 
requires me to put my kids into a survival lottery along with a lot of strangers, well, to hell 
with justice’. But for all the naturalness of that reaction, we will certainly need to hang onto 
some social organising principle with at least some of the characteristics of justice – some 
guiding rules for the allocation of responsibilities and benefits which have enough of equity, 
as well as of practicability, to be generally acceptable and thus workable – if all order, even 
in much more localised communities than we have recently been used to, is not to break 
down. 
 
That being so, a response more in line with the considerations which we have been exploring 
– an attempt to let go of this crucial value without giving up on it – might be to say: given the 
radically transformative nature of the tragic process which will deliver us into the broken 
world, we simply can’t know, pre-tragically, what the value of justice will mean for us post-
tragically, nor the pattern of relations with our other values (those of family and community 
loyalty in particular) in which it will then sit. While we can hardly help viewing such a world 
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prospectively with horror – that, after all, is why the prospect of it is tragic – we perhaps need 
not view it, in its moral dimensions, with either cynicism or nihilism. We could instead trust 
to our moral creativity, making what arrangements for the future we practically can while 
remaining as generous and as open-hearted as we are able.  
 
And then, of course, comes the real work: somehow, the possible forms of such preparation 
for the future will need sketching.  
 
VII. 
By way of concluding (or at any rate, of stopping for the moment) I return to Nietzsche. 
 
If the foregoing is at all persuasive, we can now perhaps recognise Yeats’ ‘tragic joy’ or the 
Nietzschean Dionysiac as our indefeasible delight, at this great crisis of the human adventure, 
in re-evaluative energy itself, energy released by radical challenge – our delight in that 
opening up of our self-understanding to creative destruction and renewal which tragedy, 
properly acknowledged, must bring. In this creative energy, the indestructible might of life, 
though trampled on by overweening human billions world-wide, now reasserts itself. Any 
hope which we can draw from the tragic prospect of what we must now endure, will then 
spring up as a renewed sense of that fundamental creativity: a sense that against whatever 
odds – even odds so great as massive climate change – life, in us as more widely, will go on 
re-making itself. 
 
That sense affords us no guarantee. There is no certainty that life on Earth will not be ended 
by human actions. But we must let go of certainty, and of the desire for it. To do so is already 
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